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Global environmental change challenges humanity because of its broad scale, long-lasting, and potentially irreversible consequences. Key to an 
effective response is to use an appropriate scientific lens to peer through the mist of uncertainty that threatens timely and appropriate decisions 
surrounding these complex issues. Identifying such corridors of clarity could help understanding critical phenomena or causal pathways 
sufficiently well to justify taking policy action. To this end, we suggest four principles: Follow the strongest and most direct path between 
policy decisions on outcomes, focus on finding sufficient evidence for policy purpose, prioritize no-regrets policies by avoiding options with 
controversial, uncertain, or immeasurable benefits, aim for getting the big picture roughly right rather than focusing on details.
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Global environmental change poses unprecedented    challenges to humanity because of its broad-scale, long-
lasting, and potentially irreversible consequences. Many 
aspects of the Anthropocene, in which humans are the 
dominant driver of earth system dynamics (Crutzen and 
Stoermer 2000, Waters et al. 2016), are novel. This novelty 
reduces our ability to use the past to forecast the future 
(Brondizio et al. 2016). In addition, technological and social 
innovations, along with feedbacks among environmental, 
socioeconomic, and political spheres, lead to complex sys-
tem dynamics that confound our ability to accurately antici-
pate the future (Polasky et al. 2011, Homer-Dixon et al. 2015, 
Keys et al. 2019).
Despite the potentially large consequences for current and 
future human well-being, human institutions have largely 
failed to develop effective responses to global environmental 
change (Walker et  al. 2009, Galaz 2014). Climate change, 
loss of biodiversity, and pandemic responses are examples 
in which the global community has not taken sufficient 
action to address threats (IPCC 2014, 2018, IPBES 2019, 
Osterholm and Olshaker 2020). A wide range of factors 
can explain inaction in the policy sphere including the lack 
of effective or charismatic leadership, the lack of engaged 
stakeholders to generate political will, the lack of resources, 
and disagreements over values and priorities. In the present 
article, we focus on the role that uncertainty and complexity 
play in impeding progress on global environmental change, 
and the role that science could play in overcoming these 
impediments.
Uncertainty obscures the links from actions to outcomes, 
making it hard to discern whether taking an action will lead 
to a desirable or undesirable outcome. Uncertainty can also 
make it hard to know which alternative is likely to be a bet-
ter choice. Fear that a choice could lead to a bad outcome, 
or is not as good as another choice, can result in paralyzing 
uncertainty (Markus and Schwartz 2010), which we define 
as uncertainty leading to a failure to act even in the face 
of looming threats. Uncertainty can cause reluctance to 
adopt policy changes, even when such reforms are likely 
to generate positive net benefits (Fernandez and Rodrik 
1991). Uncertainty may be real (it is beyond the ability of 
current science to predict the outcome) or perceived (deci-
sion-makers believe there is uncertainty). Mixing together 
groups with conflicting values and the potential for creating 
perceived uncertainty is particularly problematic. Different 
policy options may create distinct groups of winners and 
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losers. Groups that feel they will probably lose with policy 
reforms may adopt deliberate strategies to create doubts 
about scientific findings (Oreskes and Conway 2010), or 
issue calls for further research as a means of delaying or dis-
couraging action. For example, industry groups who oppose 
climate regulations have invested in organizations that 
question or deny the results of mainstream climate science 
(Oreskes and Conway 2010, Dunlap and McCright 2011, 
2015). Uncertainty and political polarization can lead groups 
who favor different policies to draw different conclusions 
from outcomes, which can further entrench the political 
polarization (Dixit and Weibull 2007).
What can science and an associated science–policy inter-
face do to help overcome paralyzing uncertainty? Telling 
decision-makers that the world is complex and that science 
cannot provide all the answers, although accurate, does not 
lead to a fruitful science–policy interface. In the present 
article, we argue that an important component of the answer 
is to use the right scientific lens to peer through the mist of 
uncertainty surrounding complex issues. The complex web 
of causality that typically links policy actions to outcome 
in social–ecological systems may have corridors of clarity, 
which we define as evidence-based scientific understanding 
of critical phenomena or causal pathways that are sufficient 
to justify taking policy action. The most constructive sci-
ence–policy interfaces occurs when scientific information 
makes clear links between policy choices and outcome, and 
this can be clearly communicated and readily understood by 
decision-makers in a timely manner (sensemaking; Weick 
1988). Corridors of clarity strip away aspects of complexity 
and uncertainties that are largely irrelevant for decision-
making while retaining conceptual clarity and scientific 
rigor. The idea of a corridor of clarity is similar to the notion 
of requisite simplicity (Stirzaker et  al. 2010), or Einstein’s 
quote about science that “Everything should be made as 
simple as possible but no simpler.” Clearly communicating 
results that emerge from analysis of a corridor of clarity can 
counteract the potentially paralyzing effect of uncertainty in 
complex environmental issues.
Finding corridors of clarity: General principles and 
illustrative examples
Science can contribute to effective governance of global 
environmental change by clearly articulating and quantify-
ing important causal pathways from policy decisions to 
their likely outcomes. Although science thrives by gaining 
ever more nuanced and detailed description of reality, such 
details may not be that useful to decision-makers. In the 
present article, we outline four general principles for finding 
corridors of clarity.
Follow the strongest and most direct path between pol-
icy decisions and outcomes. The most important scientific 
information for decision-making connects policy decisions 
to likely outcomes of interest in a clear and direct manner. 
By focusing on the most direct and well-established causal 
pathways, corridors of clarity can provide sufficient relevant 
information, while not focusing on uncertainty of little rel-
evance for policy.
Consider the case of climate change and land-use change, 
which are two fundamental and pervasive aspects of global 
environmental change. Although there are many causal 
pathways linking climate and land-use change to outcomes 
of interest, some pathways have fewer steps in the causal 
chain as well as a greater degree of certainty for each link in 
the chain. For example, one relatively direct pathway from 
climate and land-use change to outcomes affecting human 
well-being involves the probability of flooding. Changes 
in precipitation or storm intensity, influenced by climate 
change, and changes in runoff, retention, or protection from 
storm surge, influenced by land-use change, can affect the 
probability of flooding and its consequent impacts on lives 
lost and property damage (figure 1). Das and Vincent (2009) 
showed that mangroves protected coastal villages from a 
super cyclone that struck Orissa, India in 1999. Even though 
conserving mangrove may have other societal benefits, they 
found that flood mitigation benefits alone justified man-
grove conservation. Watson and colleagues (2016) estimated 
that preserving wetlands in a watershed in Vermont reduced 
property damage downstream by 54%–78%, with estimated 
benefits from $3 million to $30 million for one downstream 
town (Middlebury), making “a compelling case for the role of 
green infrastructure in building resilience to climate change” 
(Watson et al. 2016: 16). There is a rapidly expanding body 
of work on ecosystem services that quantifies many links 
between land-use change and human well-being (IPBES 
2019) and highlights cases in which conservation more than 
pays for itself through increased value of ecosystem services 
(e.g., Balmford et al. 2002, Nelson et al. 2009, Bateman et al. 
2013). The effects of climate change on ecosystem services 
are also becoming clearer, although many of these links still 
have considerable uncertainty (Runting et al. 2017).
Other pathways also link climate and land-cover change to 
changes in human well-being, but these pathways are typically 
more complex, more uncertain, or less important in terms of 
the magnitude of change on human well-being. For example, 
altered land-cover affects biodiversity (e.g., Newbold et  al. 
2015), with consequent changes in ecological processes that 
modify the provision of various ecosystem services (e.g., Díaz 
et al. 2006, Cardinale et al. 2012) that affect human well-being 
(figure 1). However, the relationship between biodiversity, 
ecological processes, and their subsequent impacts on the 
provision of ecosystem services is complex with large uncer-
tainties (Loreau et al. 2002, Tilman et al. 2014).
Environmental topics such as plastic debris in the oceans 
and extinction of charismatic species receive much pub-
lic attention. Research funding has followed. However, 
this research often focuses on unravelling effects that are 
complex as well as uncertain and possibly weak (figure 2). 
Examples include the effect of plastic on organisms and eco-
system functioning (Koelmans et al. 2017, Burns and Boxall 
2018, Besseling et  al. 2019). A self-propelling feedback 
between interest and funding promotes a continued focus 
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on complex effects. This is a problem both because of the 
diversion of funding and scientific brainpower from more 
important topics and because a focus on uncertain causal 
links may ultimately undermine support for managing the 
problem. There are good reasons to reduce plastic debris 
that have nothing to do with these complex causal links. A 
more direct reason to control plastic pollution is the broad 
concern of the public about plastic debris and its impact on 
the subjective experience of unspoiled nature (Koelmans 
et al. 2017).
Finding sufficient evidence. Corridors of clarity can help focus 
on what scientific information is sufficient for policy pur-
poses. In some cases, focusing on more readily measurable 
links, without getting to complex or difficult to measure 
links, is sufficient. For example, reducing emissions of air 
pollutants may have a wide range of benefits to society, but 
focusing on human health benefits alone can be sufficient 
to show that the benefits of emission reductions is worth 
the cost. An analysis by the US Environmental Protection 
Agency of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 projected 
that benefits of emissions reductions in 2020 would be 
nearly $2 trillion, of which over 90% were related to reduc-
tions in premature mortality, versus $65 billion in costs 
($2006; USEPA 2011).
Similarly, the benefits of providing clean drinking water 
provide sufficient information to justify protection of water-
shed in the Catskill Mountains near New York City. The 
estimated cost of conserving the watersheds was $1billion 
to $1.5 billion, but the cost of not doing so was far higher: 
Building and operating a water filtration plant was esti-
mated to cost $6 billion to 8 billion (Ashendorff et al. 1997, 
Chichilnisky and Heal 1998). Conserving the watersheds 
also enhanced the provision of other ecosystem services, 
but the choice of whether to conserve watershed could be 
justified solely on the basis of protecting the water supply 
(NRC 2005). The example of New York City inspired new 
science and policies aiming to protect watersheds to secure 
safe drinking water and generate other benefits (Goldman-
Benner et al. 2012, Brauman et al. 2019).
No-regrets policies. Similar to focusing on 
sufficient information, no-regrets poli-
cies are ones in which a policy action 
is justified by taking account of clear 
benefits, even without factoring in more 
controversial, uncertain, or hard to 
quantity benefits. For example, although 
there are numerous uncertainties in the 
links between greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions and human well-being, many 
actions that reduce GHG emissions gen-
erate sufficient additional benefits to jus-
tify taking action even without reference 
to climate change. Many investments 
in energy efficiency, such as improved 
Figure 1. The ecosystem service of flood mitigation links 
climate and land-cover change to changes in human well-
being. The large arrows indicate this corridor of clarity. 
Climate and land-use change affect the probability of 
flooding (upper large arrows). Floods can cause injuries 
and deaths along with extensive property damage (lower 
large arrow). Numerous other pathways also link climate 
and land-cover change to changes in well-being, including 
links through changes in biodiversity, carbon cycling, and 
nutrient cycling. Each of these other pathways contains 
weak links (the dashed arrows), involving greater 
complexity and larger uncertainty, or having small impact 
on human well-being. Image by Ruby Creative.
a b
Figure 2. Plastic debris effects on human wellbeing. a) Effects of plastic on 
biodiversity and ecosystem functioning are complex and overall possibly 
minor. b) The more direct pathway for which there is stronger evidence is the 
negative view of the public about plastic debris and its impact on the subjective 
experience of unspoiled nature.
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insulation, lighting, appliances, and building design, gen-
erate cost savings from lower energy bills and make sense 
strictly from a private financial perspective independent 
of climate or other environmental benefits. In the United 
States, investments in energy efficiency of about $520 bil-
lion have been estimated to generate savings of $1.2 trillion 
(Granade et al. 2009: vii), more than paying for themselves, 
even without consideration of environmental benefits. In 
addition, reducing energy use would also improve air qual-
ity, generating large public health benefits. For example, 
the National Research Council estimated that air pollution 
damages from coal-fired electricity production in 2005 was 
$62 billion (NRC 2010). Rather than trying to resolve the 
many uncertainties we face, we can instead focus on identi-
fying key policy relevant issues that could change the policy 
choice.
Seeing the forest for the trees. The painter Georges Seurat 
 (figure 3) constructed his paintings using small dots of paint. 
Standing close to his paintings one can see the dots. Only by 
stepping back from the painting can one see what the paint-
ing actually represents. Scientists facing an issue as complex 
as global environmental change in the Anthropocene often 
feel the temptation to retreat to safe science by focusing on 
smaller problems, or insisting on collecting ever more data 
and building ever more sophisticated models, in an attempt 
to more accurately and rigorously capture reality (i.e., get-
ting each dot right). However, more complicated models do 
not necessarily predict future outcomes better than simpler 
models (Burnham and Anderson 2002), and an overload of 
information can lead to cherry picking facts, greater polar-
ization, and confirmation bias (Sharot 2018).
Experiments at the scale of the policy issue are more rel-
evant to policy choice and therefore more persuasive to poli-
cymakers. Studies of whole ecosystems, which is the scale 
of relevant impacts, have contributed valuable information 
about the effect of acid precipitation in watersheds (Likens 
1992), eutrophication of lakes (Schindler 2012), and bioma-
nipulation of lakes that can be employed to improve water 
quality (Bernes et al. 2015). In each case, narrower studies 
of parts of the problem did not clearly predict ecosystem 
response. The effects of phosphorus, nitrogen, and inorganic 
carbon on algae in small enclosures, for example, gave con-
flicting results about causes of eutrophication, but whole-
lake experiments showed clearly that phosphorus input was 
the primary driver. Experiments in small enclosures com-
monly fail to predict results of experiments on whole lakes 
(Schindler et al. 1987, Levine and Schindler 1992, Carpenter 
and Kitchell 1993, Gonzalez and Frost 1994). Whole-lake 
experiments seem realistic to the general public, managers, 
and policymakers and are therefore considered in real-world 
decisions (Carpenter 1998, Schindler 1998).
Figure 3. Gray Weather, Grande Jatte, ca 1886–1888, by Georges Seurat, The Metropolitan Museum of Art. Zooming in on 
details only reveals bundles of small dots of different colors. The full picture only appears when observing from a distance. 
Image: Peter Barritt / Alamy Stock Photo, modified by the authors.
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Conclusions
The complexities and uncertainties of global environmen-
tal change should not be an excuse for inaction. Science 
produces compelling evidence relevant for policy purposes 
when we conduct research at the relevant scales (Carpenter 
1998), use models and statistics that embrace uncertainty 
(Biggs et  al. 2009), and seek corridors of clarity. Finding 
corridors of clarity that focus on direct, well-supported, and 
understandable links between policy decisions and outcomes 
that affect human well-being is one pragmatic approach to 
better link science with policy. Pursuing corridors of clarity 
can also be a useful defense against paralyzing uncertainty 
and the efforts of vested interests to magnify uncertainty 
in order to block progress on global environmental change 
issues. Taking immediate action following a corridor of clar-
ity may also buy time to learn how to address the less well 
understood or more complex causal links.
Of course, the corridors of clarity approach will not help 
in all situations, either because there are no clear pathways 
between policy choices and human well-being, or because 
other considerations block effective action on global envi-
ronmental change. For example, even though there are rela-
tively clear links between overfishing, declines in fish stocks, 
and reduced incomes for fishermen, overfishing in the 
oceans continues because of a lack of effective institutions to 
deal with the tragedy of the commons (e.g., Dietz et al. 2003, 
Walker et al. 2009).
Promoting any particular corridor of clarity requires 
careful thought about unintended consequences that might 
occur through indirect pathways that turn out to be impor-
tant (Mace et  al. 2012). But if every pathway is important, 
then nothing is important; policymakers must choose the 
path that is most likely to have desired outcomes. The 
seeming simplicity of corridors of clarity should rest on a 
state-of-the-art understanding of the full web of causality in 
a complex social–ecological system and may therefore only 
emerge after careful study of the dynamics of such systems. 
This entails taking a holistic view rather than acquiring 
detailed knowledge of each part of a system.
In view of the fundamental difficulties of communicating 
the implications of the uncertainties associated with various 
actions, highlighting corridors of clarity may be a powerful 
way to visualize relevant scientific insight in complex envi-
ronmental situations and help crystallize the will to act.
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